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THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AS A LIMITATION ON
THE REACH OF STATE LEGISLATION: AN HISTORICAL AND ANALYTICAL EXAMINATION OF
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Wilbur D. Preston, Jr.t
and
Gerson B. Mehlmant
Since the adoption of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court has vacillatedon
the appropriate standard of review by which questions of
infringement of liberty and property interests by state
legislation are to be judged. This Article discusses the
doctrine of substantive due process and examines its use by
the Supreme Court since the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment. The authors criticize the current Court'snarrow
and inconsistent construction of the due process clause.
They recommend that the Court adopt and apply a standard
of reasonablenesswhen reviewing the reach of state legislation.
INTRODUCTION

In his recent book analyzing the fourteenth amendment, noted
constitutional scholar Raoul Berger stated that "[t]he [f]ourteenth
[a]mendment is the case study par excellence of what Justice Harlan
described as the Supreme Court's 'exercise of the amending power',
its continuing revision of the Constitution under the guise of
interpretation." 1 The most dramatic example of the Supreme Court's
exercise of its "self-proclaimed power ' 2 to review the Constitution
and to widen or limit its scope occurs when the Court construes the
t A.B., 1946, Western Maryland College; L.L.B., 1949, University of Maryland;
Partner, Whiteford, Taylor, Preston, Trimble and Johnston; Member of the
Baltimore City (President 1973-74), Maryland State (President 1975-76) and
American Bar Associations; Fellow, American College of Trial Lawyers.
I B.A., 1973, University of Maryland Baltimore County; J.D., 1977 magna cum
laude, University of Baltimore; Associate, Whiteford, Taylor, Preston, Trimble
and Johnston; Member of the Baltimore City, Maryland State and American Bar
Associations.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the guidance and assistance rendered
by Stanley B. Rohd, Partner, Whiteford, Taylor, Preston, Trimble and Johnston.
1. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 1 (1977). [hereinafter cited as BERGER],
citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 591 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
2. Although the concept of judicial review has been firmly entrenched since
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), the legitimacy of it under the
Constitution has been questioned. Compare R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE
SUPREME COURT (1969) with L. LEVY, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE SUPREME
COURT (1967). See generally BERGER, supra note 1, at 351-62; Grey, "Do We Have
an Unwritten Constitution?", 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975).
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substantive aspects of that deceptively simple phrase, "nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . . "3 Indeed, one commentator observed that the
history of substantive due process is the "classic example of
'government by judiciary.'" 4 Depending on the prevailing political
slant of the members of the Court, the due process clause has been
viewed alternatively as a constitutional mandate for restraint of
state legislative regulation or for indulgence of the rights vested in
the citizens of the state.
For approximately the first eighty years of constitutional
adjudication, the Supreme Court did not employ the due process
clause contained in the fifth amendment as a vehicle by which to
limit the substance of federal legislation. 5 Once the due process
clause appeared in the fourteenth amendment, however, a conflict
began between those who saw due process as a check on the content
of burgeoning legislation and those who believed its use should be
limited to guaranteeing procedural rights.
After the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, the Court
initially approached the due process clause cautiously, attempting to
limit its use as a protection against state legislative measures. 6 By
the turn of the twentieth century, however, the Court had fully
accepted the due process clause as a means of protecting certain
liberty or property rights not explicitly guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights from encroachment by an exercise of the states' police
powers. This expanded review came to be known as substantive due
process. For the next thirty years, the Court wielded the due process
clause "to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and
industrial conditions, because they [were] unwise, improvident, or
out of harmony with a particular school of thought." 7 During this
period, known as the Lochner era,' the Court expansively interpreted
the due process clause to use it as a means of engrafting its
members' views on the fabric of American society.

3. U.S. CONST. amend.
4.

XIV, §

1.

R. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 132 (1960), cited in BERGER,

supra note 1, at 249.
5. A. MASON & W. BEANEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 321-22 (3d ed. 1964)
[hereinafter cited as MASON & BEANEY].

6. See text accompanying notes 78-117 infra.
7. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S 483, 488 (1955). See also MASON
& BEANEY, supra note 5, at 322: "[T]he [due process] clause was no sooner
inserted in the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment than it became the rallying point for
those who resisted the effort of the government to control the expanding
industrial economy."
8. The leading case of the period was Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The
legislation reviewed in Lochner, as well as most of the cases of this period,
involved economic matters affecting the marketplace. See generally Strong, The
Economic Philosophy of Lochner: Emergence, Embrasure & Emasculation, 15
ARIz. L. REV. 419 (1973).
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Beginning in 1934, however,. in the case of Nebbia v. New York, 9
the Court indicated that it no longer favored a type of judicial review
that permitted it to "sit as a superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of
legislation." 10 By 1965, the Court had retreated so far from the
expansive construction given the due process clause during the
Lochner era that most commentators and observers could safely
declare the demise of substantive due process.'1
After some ambiguity in interim decisions, 12 the Court grudgingly dusted off the concept of substantive due process in 1977 and
once again acknowledged it as the basis for decision in Moore v. City
of East Cleveland, Ohio.1 3 The analysis employed in Moore,
however, did not embody the expansive view of the due process
clause that marked the Lochner era. Indeed, last Term in the case of
Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,4 the Court further constricted substantive due process as a limitation upon the powers of
the state.
It is the purpose of this article to trace the Supreme Court's use
of the due process clause as a check upon the content of legislation
that restricts liberty or property rights not explicitly protected by the
Bill of Rights. The authors believe that the emerging picture shows
that the Supreme Court has abdicated its role of protecting certain
liberty and property rights against unreasonable legislation in favor
of endowing state legislation with a conclusive presumption of
constitutionality. The only exception to this presumption of
constitutionality occurs when the Court decides that certain rights
are so fundamental that they are included within the due process
clause's liberty interest, and therefore deserve constitutional protection. In their conclusion, the authors advocate that the Court steer a
middle course between the excesses of the Lochner era and the
unduly restrictive view of today in order to protect basic liberty and
property rights against unreasonable legislation.
I.

THE CONCEPT OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND
THE MODE OF DUE PROCESS REVIEW

The emergence of due process as a check on the content of
legislation is a microcosm of the eternal tension in a democratic
society between the rights of the individual and the power of the
government to affect those rights. Although this conflict often
appears to involve an intra-governmental struggle between the
9. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
10. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952).
11. See, e.g., McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 S. CT. REV. 34, 42-43 [hereinafter referred to as
McCloskey].
12. See text accompanying notes 208-12 infra.
13. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
14. 98 S. Ct. 2207 (1978).
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legislature and the judiciary, the foundation of the debate is the
individuals' right to freedom of life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness.
The concept of substantive due process parallels the social
compact theory first enunciated by John Locke in the seventeenth
century. 15 This theory conditions the power of government upon its
protecting rights inherent in the citizenry and reserved to them
when entering into the contract to be governed. 16 This is considered
a "natural law" that transcends any written constitution. Indeed, a
written constitution is not considered the source of the citizen's
rights, but rather merely reinforces them. 17 Natural law principles
forbid exercises of the government's police powers that do not serve
the public good but instead restrict inherent rights to liberty or
property.18 The Supreme Court acknowledges natural law principles
when it applies certain extra-constitutional rights to the liberty and
property interests of the fourteenth amendment.1 9
The corollary to the extra-constitutional liberty and property
rights vested in the citizenry is the government's police powers to
further the public good. As noted by the Court, "the term 'police
power' connotes the time tested conceptional limits of public
encroachment upon private interests. 2° More specifically, Justice
15.

LOCKE, Two TREATISES ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT
WESTERN CIVILIZATION 95-136 (McGarry ed. 1963).

excerpted in

SOURCES

OF

16. The inherent right thought by Locke to be most deserving of protection was the
preservation of property. Id. at Book II § 124, cited in Howe, The Meaning of
"Due Process of Law" Prior to the Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, 18
CALIF. L. REV. 583, 588 (1930) [hereinafter referred to as Howe].
17. See Henry v. Dubuque & P. R.R. Co., 10 Iowa 540, 544 (1860) ("To be ...
protected [in the use and enjoyment of property] and thus secure . . .is a right
inalienable, a right which a written constitution may recognize or declare, but
which existed independently of and before such recognition, and which no
government can destroy.").
18. See generally T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE UNION (1868);
Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42
HARV. L. REV. 149, 365 (1928-29) [hereinafter referred to as Corwin]; Grant, The
Natural Law Background of Due Process, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 56 (1931); Howe,
supra note 16. Opposed to the natural law concept of inherent rights was the
theory that the citizenry surrendered its inherent rights to government upon the
adoption of a constitution. See Vanhorn's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304,
310 (1795) ("The preservation of property ... is a primary object of the social
compact, and, by the late constitution of Pennsylvania, was made a fundamental
law.").
19. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). The Justices
disagreed as to whether the right implicated in Moore, that of an extended family
to live together, rested in the liberty interest or the property interest. Compare
Justices Powell's and Marshall's opinions, Id. at 494; 506 with Justice Stevens's
opinion. Id. at 513. During the Lochner era, the Court generally focused on the
inherent right of liberty to contract, which it held came within the liberty
interest. Prior to the fourteenth amendment's adoption, the Court focused on the
right to enjoy one's property interests. Notwithstanding Stevens's opinion in
Moore, the Court continues to focus on the liberty interest. See, e.g., Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
20. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, New York, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
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Taney defined the police powers of government inherent in every
sovereignty "as the power to govern men and things within the
2
limits of its dominion." 1
22
Because the rights inherent in the citizenry are not absolute,
and because the very existence of government implies a power to
govern, the Court is required to balance the respective interests
involved when there is a conflict. During the period when
substantive due process was a viable and vital theory, the following
question was posed by the Court:
Is this a fair, reasonable and appropriate exercise of the
police power of the State, or is it an unreasonable,
unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right of the
individual . . .?23
The cornerstone of the mode of review suggested by the question
quoted above was "reasonable." An unreasonable exercise of the
police powers was labeled a deprivation of due process that was
2
prohibited by the Constitution. 1
The substantive due process review originally applied by the
Court to ascertain the reasonableness vel non of legislation involved
a two-step scrutiny of the objectives or ends sought to be obtained by
the legislation and the means employed to achieve the ends. 25 This
analytical process clearly focused on the reasonableness factor; the
nature of the right implicated by the legislation was expounded on
by the Court but did not actually form the basis for decision.
When using the first step of the analysis during the Lochner era,
the Court generally closely scrutinized the legislative objectives to
determine if they truly comported with the Court's vision of what
would further the public good. 26 Although the Court acknowledged
the legislature's power to enact legislation promoting the public
health, safety, morals and general welfare, it maintained that the
due process clause empowered it to serve as the final arbiter of
21. Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 583 (1847). See also E. FREUND,
THE POLICE POWER, PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS iii (1904)
("[T]he power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the
use of liberty and property.").
22. See Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 534
(1923), in which the Court declared:
While there is no such thing as absolute freedom of contract and it is
subject to a variety of restraints, they must not be arbitrary or
unreasonable. Freedom is the general rule, and restraint the exception.
The legislative authority to abridge can be justified only by exceptional
circumstances.
23. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).
24. See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591 (1897).
25. Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited: Reflections on (And Beyond) Recent
Cases, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 417, 422 (1977).
26. See Howe, supra note 16, at 588-89. In Lochner, the Court invalidated a New
York law limiting bakers' work week to 60 hours because, inter alia,the interests
of the public were not "in the slightest degree affected." 198 U.S. at 57.
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whether the public good would be served by the objective sought to
be attained by the legislation. 27 If the Court's view of the public good
conflicted with that of the legislature, the Court invalidated the
legislation as an arbitrary and capricious exercise of governmental
power, which, when measured against the protected right, was
28
infirm under the Constitution.

The second step formerly taken by the Court under substantive
due process review required that the means be reasonably related to
the desired objectives of the legislation. 29 Moreover, even if there was
some relationship between the means and the end, unduly restrictive
means in light of other possible or existing measures were held to be
a deprivation of due process. 30 During the Lochner era, the burden of
showing that the means related to the end was not insurmountable,
and the Court could be persuaded that the public good was served by
legislation that the Court normally would have invalidated. 31
The limitation of substantive due process review begun in
Nebbia was in large part a revolt by the members of the Court
against imposing their personal views as to which legislative
objectives served the public good. Although the Court rhetorically
continued to apply the principle that the objectives of governmental
power had to be reasonable and in the public interest, the Court
absolutely deferred to the legislatures' determination of what
objectives were desirable and therefore reasonable. Similarly,
although the Court in Moore applied the second step of the former
mode of review, the end-means test, the opinion in Exxon Corp.
ended its application, except where legislation implicated a fundamental right.
Moore, the first decision in forty years to invalidate state
legislation solely on substantive due process grounds, did not
actually address the issue of proper legislative objectives, except to
27. In determining what constituted the public good, the Court apparently was
guided by the theory of Social Darwinism as advocated by Herbert Spencer. See

R.

28.
29.

30.
31.

HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 1860-1915 (1945).

The Court was seemingly so enamored with the theories of Mr. Spencer that
Justice Holmes, a frequent dissenter during the Lochner era, believed it
necessary to admonish his fellow justices that the fourteenth amendment "does
not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statistics." Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. at 53-56.
See, e.g., Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937)
(regulations requiring natural gas producers to prorate the production of gas
were invalid because the means, proration, bore no reasonable relation to the
ends, prevention of waste and protection of correlative rights). Cf. Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (state cannot prohibit abortions during the first trimester of
pregnancy as it bears no reasonable relation to protection of the mother's life).
See, e.g., Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937);
Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402 (1926). See also Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), but compare with Adkins v.
Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
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hold that they were not reasonably served by the ordinance in
question. The Court in Moore concentrated on the right allegedly
infringed upon rather than on the reasonableness vel non of the
legislation. The Court now pays scant attention to the reasonableness of legislation unless a governmental interest is sufficiently
32
important to require balancing with the right of the individual.
Whereas reasonable legislation was the focal point under
original substantive due process analysis, the Court now focuses on
the nature of the right that is claimed to be abridged by an exercise
of the police powers. The question of the reasonableness vel non of
legislation has lost any relevance except where a fundamental right
is at issue. Generally, those guarantees in the Bill of Rights are
considered so fundamental as to be encompassed by the liberty
interest of the due process clause. In addition, the Court recognizes
the rights to privacy and sanctity of the family as fundamental
enough to American values to be33within the ambit of the liberty
interest of the due process clause.
Once a right is found to be fundamental enough to be part of
constitutionally protected liberty, the Court then closely scrutinizes
the legislation allegedly impugning the right. If the Court rejects the
right as not being within the liberty interest, then there is no
meaningful review of legislation. Even the most unreasonable
legislation apparently does not violate the due process clause under
'new" substantive due process review unless the right abridged is
considered by the Court to be fundamental so as to be within the
liberty interest of the due process clause.
II. THE ROOTS OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
The concept of due process of law originated 34 in the clause of
the Magna Charta that provided,
[n]o free man shall be taken or imprisoned or deprived of his
freehold or his liberties or free customs, or outlawed, or
exiled, or in any manner destroyed, nor shall we go upon
him, nor shall we send upon him, except35by a legal judgment
of his peers or by the law of the land.

32. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (balancing the state's interest in mothers'
health and in fetuses against the mothers' interest in securing an abortion).
33. See text accompanying notes 208-12, 218 infra.
34. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272,
276 (1855).
35. MAGNA CHARTA Ch. 29, quoted in Corwin, supra note 18, at 177. A debate has
always surrounded the Magna Charta as to whether it was a tribute to human
rights or merely a grant of feudal privilege inimical to popular liberties. W.
Brockelbank, The Role of Due Process in American Constitutional Law, 39
CORNELL L.Q. 561, 561-65 (1954) [hereinafter referred to as Brockelbank].
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The concept was reiterated approximately 100 years later in Chapter
3 of 28 Edward III:
No man of what state or condition he be, shall be put out of
his land or tenements, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor
disinherited, nor put to death,36 without he be brought to
answer by due process of law.
"law of the land" and "due process of
Coke stated that the phrases
37
law" were synonymous.
Convincing arguments have been set forth that the phrases "due
process of law" or "law of the land" refer only to procedures that
must be followed in judicial proceedings. 38 A plain reading of either
in the context of the English statutes quoted above certainly gives
added credence to those arguments. The Supreme Court's recent
application of the due process clause in Moore, however, affirms that
such discussions are entirely academic. Moore clearly establishes
that due process refers to both the manner and the substance of
government action. The historical transformation from procedure to
both procedure and substance is evidence of the Supreme Court's
struggle to limit state infringement of certain liberty or property
rights that were considered to be inherent in every citizen of the
country, albeit not expressly contained in the Constitution.
Although there is some evidence that this problem was
considered by the Framers, 39 the Court first addressed the issue of
extra-constitutional limitation on the states' police powers in the
seriatim opinions in Calder v. Bull'.4 In that case, the Connecticut
legislature had passed a law setting aside a probate decree that had
denied recordation of a will. A second probate hearing was held that
approved the will and entered it into the probate record. The
plaintiffs, who would have shared in the decedent's estate had the
will been set aside, brought suit claiming that the Connecticut
statute was an ex post facto law and, therefore, prohibited by the
41
Constitution.
The Court upheld the Connecticut statute, holding that the ex
post facto clause of the Constitution applied only to criminal laws
enacted by the states. A disagreement among members of the Court
with regard to natural law concepts of rights and implied limits on
36. 28 Edw. III c. 3 (1335) quoted in Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law
Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 368 (1911).
37. 2 EDWARD COKE'S INSTrrUTEs 56, quoted in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516,

38.
39.
40.
41.

524 (1884). There has been some controversy as to the accuracy of Coke's
pronouncement, but as noted by one commentator, "Coke's mistakes, it is said,
are the common law." Brockelbank, supra note 35, at 562 (emphasis in original).
See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 1, at 195-214.
Id. at 300-11.
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
Id. at 386-87.
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government power was evident, however, in the opinions of Justices
Chase and Iredell.42 Justice Chase opined that the state legislature
should not be considered omnipotent:
[A]lthough its authority [is] not ... expressly restrained by
the constitution, or fundamental law of the state ....
The
purposes for which men enter into society ...
are the

foundation of the legislative power, [and] they will decide
what are the proper objects of it. The nature,43 and ends of
legislative power will limit the exercise of it.
Justice Chase further noted that "a law that takes property from A
and gives it to B" violates a person's rights under the social
compact. 44 "It is against all reason and justice, for a people to intrust
a Legislature with such powers .

..

" and would be "political

45
heresy" to permit the legislature such powers.
Thus, Justice Chase perceived that the legislature in making the
laws was bound by principles of natural law set forth in the social
compact that inherently limited the power of the legislature. Justice
Iredell, on the other hand, was concerned with the jurisdiction of the
Court to invalidate legislative measures:

If, then, a government, composed of legislative, executive
and judicial departments, were established by a Constitution
which imposed no limits on the legislative power, the
consequence would inevitably be, that whatever the legislative power chose to enact, would be lawfully enacted, and the
judicial power could never interpose to pronounce it void. It
is true, that some speculative jurists have held, that a
legislative act against natural justice must, in itself, be void;
but I cannot think that, under such a government any court
of justice would possess a power to declare it S0.46
Presaging the post-Nebbia era, Justice Iredell declared that the
courts cannot pronounce a state statute void merely because "in
their judgment, [it is] contrary to the principles of natural justice. ' 4 7
Out of the theory espoused by Justice Chase in Calder emerged
the judicial doctrine of vested rights. 48 Chief Justice Marshall, who
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 386-95; 398-400.
Id. at 388.
Id.
Id. Justice Chase found, however, that the Connecticut statute was not excessive
and did not "take property from A. and give it to B." because the plaintiffs
possessed no vested rights as a result of the invalidation of the will.
46. Id. at 398. Justice Iredell subsequently in his opinion recognizes that any act of a
legislature violative of a constitutional provision is "unquestionably void." Id. at

399.
47. Id. at 399.
48. Howe, supra note 16, at 590. The doctrine of vested rights prohibits the
legislature from depriving an individual of a right that has vested under existing
law. Id.
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had not participated in Calder, wrote the opinion in Fletcher v.
Peck49 in 1810 and engrafted the doctrine of vested rights onto the
obligation of contract clause in the Constitution. 50 In Fletcher, the
Court set aside a Georgia statute that attempted to cancel a series of
land sales to private purchasers. Chief Justice Marshall stated that
the Georgia legislature was prevented from depriving the plaintiffs
of vested rights "either by general principles, which are common to
our free institutions, or by the particular provisions of the
constitution of the United States. ...

The idea of extra-constitutional limitations on state power
pursuant to natural law continued to appear in decisions issued by
the Court52 after Fletcher. The Court, however, generally employed
the obligation of contract clause and the doctrine of vested rights to
restrain excesses of legislative power. 53 The most illustrious of the
obligation of contract clause cases was Trustees of Dartmouth
College v.

Woodward,54 decided in 1819, in

which the Court

invalidated three New Hampshire legislative acts altering the
charter of Dartmouth College.5 5 The Court held that the charter,
which had been granted by the King of England in 1769, was a
contract that had not been dissolved as a result of the Revolution. As
such, any legislation attempting to alter the charter impaired vested
rights protected by the obligation of contract clause in the Constitu56
tion.
49. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
51. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 139. But see BERGER, supra note 1, at 253, citing
Frankfurter, John Marshalland the JudicialFunction,69 HARV. L. REV. 217, 225
(1955) (Marshall's occasional references to natural law were "'literary garniture
. . . and not a guiding means for adjudication."'). Although Justice Marshall
might have been unsure about the source of limitation which estopped the
Georgia legislature, Justice Johnson, in a concurring opinion, stated, "I do not
hesitate to declare that a state does not possess the power of revoking its own
grants. But I do it on a general principle, on the reason and nature of things: a
principle which will impose laws even on the Deity." 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 143
(Johnson, J., concurring).
52. See, e.g., Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815). The Court had before it a
Virginia statute which attempted to divest the Episcopal Church of its property
in that state. Justice Story, writing for a majority of the Court, stated that a
legislature cannot repeal a legislative grant of the right to hold property based
"upon the principles of natural justice, upon the fundamental laws of every free
government, [and] upon the spirit and letter of the Constitution.
...
Id. at 52.
Accord, Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627 (1829). See also Grant, The
Natural Law Background of Due Process, 31 COLUM L. REV. 56, 60-65 (1931).
53. See generally Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause, 57 HARV. L.
REV. 352 (1944), cited in Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 98 S. Ct. 2716
(1978).
54. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518 (1819).
55. The legislature sought, inter alia, to increase the number of trustees, to grant the
governor of the state the power to appoint the additional trustees and to create a
board of overseers. Id. at 626.
56. Professor Grant, in his article on the natural law background of the due process
clause, strenuously argued that, although the Dartmouth College case on its face
did not rest on natural law considerations, this was the actual basis for decision.
31 COLUM. L. REv. at 61-63.
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Thus, the Court, uncomfortable with a pure application of
natural law as a limitation on legislative power, employed the
obligation of contract clause to the same end. 57 The obligation of
contract clause, however, proved to be just as untrustworthy as the
application of natural law, and often led to strained decisions by the
Court.58 In addition, the obligation of contract clause provided no
excessive legislative power affecting prospective
protection against
59
uses of property.
While the Supreme Court relied upon the obligation of contract
clause to limit legislative powers, the state courts, led by the
Supreme Court of North Carolina in 1804 in Trustees of the
University of North Carolina v. Foy,6° had discovered that the due
process or law of the land clauses in their state constitutions could
serve the same ends. 6 1 The North Carolina legislature had enacted a
law repealing an earlier land grant to the university. The Foy court,
relying in part on the law of the land clause contained in the state
constitution stated,
[the law of the land clause] seems to us to warrant a belief
that members of a corporation as well as individuals shall
not be deprived of their liberties or properties unless by a
trial by jury in a court of justice, according to the known and
established rules of decision derived from the common law
and such acts of the Legislature as are consistent with the
Constitution.62
Similarly, in Hoke v. Henderson,63 decided in 1833, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina held that a person's interest in remaining in
57. See Howe, supra note 16, at 594. The various state courts divided on whether the
principles of natural law limited the legislative power, or whether a specific
constitutional limitation was necessary. Compare Menges v. Wertman, 1 Pa. 218
(1845) with Regents of the University of Maryland v. Williams, 9 Md. (G. & J.)
365 (1838). Last Term, in Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 98 S. Ct. 2716
(1978), the Court noted that the obligation of contact clause was "perhaps the
strongest single constitutional check on state legislation during our early years
as a Nation .... " Id. at 2721.
58. This was recognized by Justice Johnson in his note to Satterlee v. Mathewson, 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) 380, 681, 686 (1829). He further recognized that the problem could
have been avoided if the Court in Calder had not confined the ex post facto
clause to criminal law. Id. The obligation of contract clause was also limited in
Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36
U.S. (11 Pet.) 419 (1837), which held that ambiguities in the contract were to be
resolved in favor of the legislative will of the people.
59. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 213 (1827).
60. 5 N.C. (2 Hayw.) 57 (1804).
61. Another theory touched upon by the courts in the early years after the revolution
was use of the separation of powers and vested rights doctrines to limit the power
of the legislature. Howe, supra note 16, at 594-96. Under that theory, the scope of
the legislative power is limited to laws that prescribe for the future. As the
legislature is only possessed of legislative power, any laws affecting vested
rights were impermissible exercises of power as that was within the jurisdiction
of the judiciary. Id. at 594.
62. 5 N.C. at 63. Accord, Allen v. Peden, 4 N.C. (2 Hayw.) 442 (1816).
63. 15 N.C. (2 Dev.) 1 (1833).
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public office was a property right and a statute that arbitrarily
forced his removal from that office violated the law of the land
clause in its state's constitution.
In 1843, the Court of Appeals of New York invalidated a statute
permitting the eminent domain power of the state to be used to allow
a private individual to construct a private road across the land of
another. 64 The court specifically employed the due process clause
contained in the New York constitution, and relying on the North
Carolina decision in Hoke, declared that it prevented extra-judicial
65
forfeiture of property.
The "locus classicus" of substantive due process 66 was the New
York court's decision in 1856 in Wynehamer v. New York. 6 7 The
court in Wynehamer rejected Justice Chase's view in Calder that
principles of natural justice provided authority for the judiciary to
strike down legislation that the court believed was an excessive
exercise of the police powers. 68 The statute in Wynehamer forbade
the storage or sale of intoxicating beverages except for medicinal
purposes. The court looked to the due process clause of its state's
constitution and held that insofar as the citizens of New York had
vested rights in liquor -obtained prior to the passage of the statute,
they were deprived of their property without due process. The
legislature was thus barred by the due process clause from
69
attempting to destroy vested rights.
III. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS IN THE
SUPREME COURT
A.

Pre-FourteenthAmendment.

The concept of due process as protecting extra-constitutional
rights from unreasonable exercises of state legislative power was not
before the Supreme Court prior to the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment.70 The due process phrase contained in the fifth
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill 140 (N.Y. 1843).
Id. at 148. Accord, Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N.Y. 202 (1854).
BERGER, supra note 1, at 254-255.
13 N.Y. 378 (1856).
Id. at 391. This was a rejection of abolitionist dogma, which strongly relied on
natural law concepts. BERGER, supra note 1, at 255.
69. 13 N.Y. at 393. Accord, Ex Parte Dorsey, 7 Porter 293 (Ala. 1838); Norman v.
Heist, 5 W. & S. 171 (Pa. 1843); State v. Hayward, 3 Rich 389 (S.C. 1832); Van
Zant v. Waddell, 2 Yerg. 260 (Tenn. 1814), discussed in Corwin, The Doctrine of
Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 382-84 (1911).
Additionally and very significantly, the court in Wynehamer "enlarged the scope
of vested rights to include not only title and possession of the property in
question, but also the right to use it in the manner permitted by law at the time it
was acquired." Howe, supra, note 16, at 602. Substantive due process and 'the
decision in Wynehamer were not without critics, however, even then, and were
repudiated in part by the New York court in a decision some 10 years later.
BERGER, supra note 1, at 256. But substantive due process was eventually
ardently accepted by that court. See In the Matter of Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98 (1885).
70. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
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amendment could not be applied as a limitation on state legislative
enactments because none of the provisions in the Bill of Rights
shielded persons from state action.7 1 Due process was not, however,
without mention.
In 1855, in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
72
Co., the Supreme Court cast some light on the meaning of due
process of law.73 Although commentators have differed as to whether

the Court in Murray envisioned due process as a mere procedural
guarantee or as a limitation on the legislature,74 the language of the
Court clearly indicates that due process did include a substantive
limitation on the reach of legislative power:
[T]he warrant now in question is legal process, that is not
denied. It was issued in conformity with an act of Congress.
But is it "due process of law?" The constitution contains no
description of those processes which it was intended to allow
or forbid. It does not even declare what principles are to be
applied to ascertain whether it be due process. It is manifest
that it was not left to the legislative power to enact any
process which might be devised. The article is a restraint on
the legislative as well as on the executive and judicial
powers of the government, and cannot be so construed as to
to make any process 'due process of law',
leave congress free
75
by its mere will.

Scott v. Sanford,76 decided two years later, explicitly rested on
substantive due process grounds. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Taney stated that the federal government could exercise no power
over the property of a citizen, in this case, slaves, beyond that which
the Constitution confers, and that a law depriving a citizen of his
vested property rights was beyond the power of the Congress and
violative of due process of law.77 Thus, there was a precedent in the

Supreme Court for the use of the due process clause to limit
legislative exercises of power that infringed upon extraconstitutional liberty or property rights.
B. Post-FourteenthAmendment.
With the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, the Court
began to review infringements on property rights in the context of
the due process clause rather than in the context of the obligation of
71. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
72. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
73. Id. at 276-77. The Court stated that "due process of law" was synonymous with
the phrase "by the law of the land" contained in the Magna Charta.
74. Compare BERGER, supra note 1, at 256 n.33; with Howe, supra note 16, at 584-85.
75. 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 276.
76. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
77. Id. at 447-50.
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contract clause.78 The early cases examined whether the due process
clause expanded the Court's jurisdiction to review the substance of
state legislative action. The parameters of the liberty and/or
property rights protected by the clause were not subjected to close
scrutiny.
1.

Slaughter-House Cases

The initial foray into defining the provisions of the fourteenth
amendment came in 1873 in the Slaughter-House Cases.7 9 There, the
Court was faced with a fourteenth amendment attack on a Louisiana
law that granted a private corporation an exclusive monopoly to
operate slaughterhouses in the New Orleans area. Justice Miller
wrote the opinion for the Court and narrowly interpreted the
provisions of the fourteenth amendment.8 0 With regard to the due
process clause, he noted that although the argument had not been
pressed,
it is sufficient to say that under no construction of that
provision that we have ever seen, or any that we deem
admissible, can the restraint imposed

. . .

upon the exercise

of their trade by the butchers of New Orleans be held to be a
deprivation
of property within the meaning of that provi81
sion.
Justice Miller went on to say that any other construction would
"constitute this court a perpetual censor upon all legislation of the
82
States."
Thus, Justice Miller refused to employ the due process clause as
a grant of jurisdiction to the Court to protect the free use of existing
and vested property rights against the exercise of state police
powers. Although his analysis of the due process clause was brief, it
78. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 98 S. Ct. 2716, 2721 (1978).
79. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
80. Regarding the privileges and immunities clause, the Court held that it was
intended only to guarantee certain rights of national citizenship and did not
protect a corporation against a state law that created a monopoly. Id. at 75-80.
See BERGER, supra note 1, at 37-51. The equal protection clause was limited to
racial discrimination. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 81. While Justice Miller's construction
of the equal protection clause has not stood the test of time, his limited
interpretation of the privileges and immunities of a United States citizen
continues to be the test employed by the Court. See Madden v. Kentucky, 309
U.S. 83 (1940).
81. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 80. Justice Miller's opinion can be read as a continuation of
Justice Iredell's theory in Calder that natural law concepts regarding the
limitation of government power should not be a basis for constitutional
adjudication. Justice Miller, however, was by no means clear on that subject and
his position often vacillated. Compare Hepburn v. Griswald, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603,
638 (1869) (Miller, J., dissenting) with Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175,
207 (1864) (Miller, J., dissenting) and Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.)
655 (1874).
82. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 78.
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may be observed that he rejected the concept of extra-constitutional
rights as being included within the liberty or property interests as
well as the view that the Court was empowered to use due process as
a limitation upon the content of legislation.
Just as Justice Miller's opinion may be traced to Justice Iredell's
comments in Calder that the legislative powers of the state were not
subject to judicial veto, Justices Bradley's and Field's dissents in
Slaughter-House evolved out of Justice Chase's opinion in Calder
that natural law limited the legislative power.8 3 Justice Bradley
stated that "the right of any citizen to follow whatever lawful
employment he chooses to adopt . . .is one of his most valuable

rights, and one which the Legislature of a State cannot invade,
whether restrained by its own constitution or not. '8 4 Justice Bradley
further stated that the right to choose a lawful employment was "a
portion of.

.

.liberty," and the right to continue in an occupation

already chosen was within a citizen's property interest.85 Therefore,
the Louisiana law, he believed, deprived the butchers of their liberty
and property, and the deprivations were without due process of law
because the objective of the statute, a state created monopoly, went
beyond the permissible purpose of the state's police power by
86
benefiting one citizen at the expense of another.
The thrust of the majority opinion in Slaughter-Housewas that
the fourteenth amendment placed no additional restrictions upon the
states' police power other than those that existed prior to the
amendment's adoption.8 7 The case retarded the use of the due
process clause as the means by which to review the content of
legislation.8 8
2. Post-Slaughter-House
The year after Slaughter-HouseJustice Miller wrote the opinion
for the Court in Loan Association v. Topeka.8 9 In that case, the
Court construed a Kansas statute that permitted the city to issue
bonds aiding private enterprises, thereby implying a power to tax to
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 111.
Id.at 113-14.
Id.at 122.
Justice Field in his dissent took the view that the due process clause was
intended to "give practical effect to the declaration of 1776 of inalienable rights
." Id.at 105.
87. Butchers' Union v. Crescent City, 111 U.S. 746, 747 (1884).
88. The Court continued in other cases, however, to recognize the principle that there
are inherent limitations on the legislative power. Thus, in Cole v. La Grange, 113
U.S. 1 (1885); Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U.S. 487 (1882); and Loan Ass'n v.
Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874), the Court, without defining the origin of the
limitation, invalidated various statutes on the grounds that they violated
fundamental rights, which exceeded the proper scope of legislative power. See
Grant, The Natural Law Background of Due Process, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 56,
63-65 (1931).
89. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874).
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pay off the bonds. The plaintiffs in Loan Association argued that the
state legislature exceeded its state constitutional authority by
permitting taxation aiding private citizens at the expense of other
private citizens.
The Court agreed, noting that "[t]he theory of our governments,
State and National, is opposed to the deposit of unlimited power
anywhere. The executive, the legislative and the judicial branches of
these governments are all of limited and defined powers." 90 The
Court held that a law that furthered only the interests of private
citizens went beyond the proper scope of the legislative power.
Therefore, any tax levied by the state had to be imposed for a public
purpose and not to benefit the interests of a few. 91
It must have been difficult for attorneys of the time to
distinguish Slaughter-House and Loan Association. Although they
were decided only one year apart, one case upheld a law benefiting
one group of private citizens at the expense of another group, while
the other case invalidated such an attempt.
Justice Miller addressed the apparent paradox in 1877 in
Davidson v. New Orleans.92 In that case, the legislation subjected to
review had assessed the plaintiff for the drainage of privately owned
swamp land that was contiguous to his property. The plaintiff
argued that this assessment deprived him of his property rights
without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment. 93 The Court accepted the proposition that the plaintiff had
been deprived of a property right,94 but refused to recognize that the
due process clause empowered the Court to remedy a deprivation
that was visited upon the plaintiff as the result of the substance of
state legislation. Justice Miller noted, however, that if the Court
"were sitting in review of a Circuit Court of the United States, as [it
was] in the Loan Association v. Topeka case," it could take
cognizance of the deprivation of property rights.95 The decision in
Loan Association was based on "federal common law," 96 which
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 663.
Id. at 664-66.
96 U.S. 97 (1877).
Id. at 100.
Justice Miller analogized the plaintiffs position in Davidson to the hypothetical
one voiced by Justice Chase many years before in Calder:
It seems to us that a statute which declares in terms, and without more,
that the full and exclusive title of a described piece of land, which is now
in A., shall be and is hereby vested in B., would, if effectual, deprive A. of
his property without due process of law.
Id. at 102.
95. Id. at 105.
96. Prior to the decision in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the Court
employed principles of what was termed "federal common law" to decide cases in
which the basis for invoking federal jurisdiction was diversity of citizenship.
Erie, decided within the same period as when the Court was retreating from
substantive due process analysis, held that the federal courts must use state laws
in diversity cases.
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protected extra-constitutional liberty or property rights against the
reach of state legislation. Davidson and Slaughter-House, however,
involved interpretations of what constituted the due process required
by the fourteenth amendment. The due process clause implicated the
relationship between the federal judiciary and the states; federal
common law had no such effect.
The Court further distinguished due process from federal
common law in deciding the question of whether due process

mandated that the state must compensate a person for the
deprivation of his property for a public use. 9 7 Six years before

Davidson, the Court had ruled in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co. 98 that
tia clear principle of natural equity" required that the state
compensate those whose property was taken for a public use. 99 In
Davidson, however, the Court held that the requirement of just
compensation was not part of the due process owed by the state to its
citizens.1° °

Justice Bradley, although concurring in the result in Davidson, 10 1 continued to take issue with Justice Miller's narrow view of
the due process clause. Justice Miller believed that even if a
deprivation of property had occurred, the plaintiff had received due

process of law as a result of state judicial proceedings. 10

2

Justice

Bradley remarked, however, that property may be taken without due
process in ways other than by "direct [legislative] enactment or the

want of judicial proceeding.

' 10 3

He believed that the Court was

entitled pursuant to that provision, "not only to see that there is
some process of law, but 'due process of law,' provided by the State
law when a citizen is deprived of his property.. . . [Iln judging what
97. The plaintiff relied on the just compensation clause contained in the fifth
amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 5 ("[Njor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation.").
98. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
99. Id. at 179. The Court eventually changed its position and ruled that due process
requires just compensation when the state exercises its power of eminent domain.
Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897); Missouri Pacific Ry.
Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896). See generally Grant, The Natural Law
Background of Due Process, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 56, 71-80 (1931).
100. 96 U.S. at 105 ("[I]t must be remembered that, when the fourteenth amendment
was adopted, the provision on that subject, in immediate juxtaposition in the
fifth amendment . . . was left out."). This reasoning was to be applied later in
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), which held that due process did not
include the right to a grand jury indictment.
101. 96 U.S. at 107 (Bradley, J., concurring).
102. As stated by Justice Miller:
[I]t is not possible to hold that a party has, without due process of law,
been deprived of his property, when, as regards the issues affecting it, he
has, by the laws of the State, a fair trial in a court of justice, according to
the modes of proceeding applicable to such a case.
96 U.S. at 105. Justice Miller relied, inter alia, on Kennard v. Louisiana, 92
U.S. 480 (1876), a case in which the Court held that a statute providing for
judicial review in the event of an election contest afforded the parties due process
of law.
103. Id. at 107.
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is 'due process of law,' respect must be had to the cause and object of
the taking .... ",104
Despite the Court's refusal to accept due process as a limitation
on the reach of the police powers in Slaughter-Houseand Davidson,
litigants strenuously urged the Court to adopt due process as a
means by which to apply the natural law theory discussed above 105
of inherent limitations on the legislative power. 10 6 In Davidson,
Justice Miller noted with disapproval the multitude of cases filed in
the Court alleging due process deprivations.10 7 As the composition of
the Court began to change, however, the Court gradually expanded
its view of the scope of due process.
In 1877, in Munn v. Illinois,10s the Court upheld state legislation
that regulated rates charged by grain elevator operators. Although
deferring to the legislative determination of rates, the Court
conditioned the state's power to regulate grain elevator operators'
property rights on its being in furtherance of the public good. 10 9
Ten years later, the Court expressly announced its intention to
begin reviewing the content of state legislation in Mugler v.
Kansas.' °0 The issue before the Court in Mugler was the constitutionality of a Kansas criminal statute and constitutional provision that
prohibited the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. The
defendant, who had been convicted under the statute, argued that
his rights to manufacture and sell food and drink were fundamental
liberty rights, and the right to continue to use his property for those
purposes was a fundamental property right. The Court upheld the
defendant's conviction, agreeing with the legislative judgment that
intoxicating liquor was inimical to the public welfare, and therefore
a proper end of the state's police powers.' 1 ' The Court made clear,
however, that it did not consider itself constrained to defer blindly to
any judgment made by the legislature:
There are, of necessity, limits beyond which legislation
cannot rightfully go. While every possible presumption is to
be indulged in favor of the validity of a statute .

.

. the

courts must obey the Constitution rather than the lawmaking department of government, and must, upon their
own responsibility, determine whether, in any particular
case, these limits have been passed ....

The courts are not

bound by mere forms, nor are they to be misled by mere
104. Id. at 107 (emphasis added). Justice Bradley went on to declare that if the taking
was "arbitrary, oppressive and unjust," there occurred a deprivation of due
process. Id.
105. See text accompanying notes 15-821 supra.
106. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: CASES & MATERIALS 553 (9th ed. 1975).
107. 96 U.S. at 104.
108. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
109. Id. at 134-35.
110. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
111. Id. at 661-63.
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pretenses. They are at liberty - indeed, are under a solemn
duty - to look at the substance of things, whenever they
enter upon the inquiry whether the legislature has transcended the limits of its authority. If, therefore, a statute
purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health,
the public morals, or the public safety, has no real
substantial relation to those objects, or is a palpable
invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the
duty of the courts
to so adjudge and thereby give effect to the
Constitution. 112
In the Railroad Commission Cases," 3 the Court, although again
upholding rate regulations, warned that there was a limit to
legislative regulation and that "the power to regulate is not a power
to destroy."' 14 In Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota," 5 the Court
invalidated rates set by a state rate commission, holding that the
6
reasonableness of the rate was a question for the judiciary."
Finally, by 1898, the Court established a formula by which the7
judiciary could judge the reasonableness of rates set by the states."
Thus, after Slaughter-House, the Court came to acknowledge
that due process constituted a substantive guarantee against
unreasonable regulation."18 This coincided with the emerging socioeconomic forces culminating in the excesses of the Lochner era.
C. The Adoption Of Substantive Due Process
1. Doctrine
Along with the continuing advocacy by the bar that due process
included a substantive guarantee against unreasonable legislation,
112. Id. at 661. Justice Harlan, who wrote the opinion in Mugler, in the next Term
wrote the opinion in Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888). In Powell, the
Court upheld a Pennsylvania statute that made it a crime to manufacture or sell
products made of an oleaginous substance to take the place of butter or cheese
produced from unadulterated milk or cream. The defendant attempted to
introduce evidence showing that the prohibited product was wholesome and not
dangerous to the public. Id. 681-82. The Court upheld the exclusion of the
evidence, stating that the question whether oleomargarine was so dangerous to
the public health so as to justify prohibition as opposed to regulation was for the
legislature. Id. at 685-87. This, of course, was a substantial retreat from his
position in Mugler.
113. 116 U.S. 307 (1886).
114. Id. at 331.
115. 134 U.S. 418 (1891).
116. In Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 546 (1892), the Court diluted this holding
somewhat by ruling that it could review rates set by a commission but not by the
legislature.
117. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898). The formula required that the intrastate
rate be fair to the railroad and the public.
118. Although the case did not reach the constitutional issue of due process of law, a
significant decision during this period was Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac.
R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886), in which the Court stated that a corporation was a
"person" within the meaning of the due process clause. This case was argued by
Roscoe Conklin, one of the drafters of the fourteenth amendment. Brockelbank,
supra note 35, at 568 n.35.
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Social Darwinism, as advanced by Herbert Spencer, began to
influence the Court at the end of the nineteenth century. 119 Social
Darwinism, rooted in Darwin's theory of survival of the fittest in a
natural setting, stressed individualism and discouraged government
regulation. 120 This theory coincided with Adam Smith's economic
doctrine of laissez faire, and together, they formed a doctrinal basis
for the theory that open competition, free from government control,
would best advance the interests of the rapidly expanding economy.

121

These social and economic theories were thought to embody
what was in the public good. A law that subjected the individual to
government regulation was deemed inimical to the public good,
unless special circumstances were shown, such as through the
Brandeis brief, establishing through extra-judicial sources that
laissez faire was not in the public's best interest. 22 Judicial
application of these socio-economic theories became known as
substantive economic due process.
Prior to the adoption of substantive economic due process, the
majority of the Court disagreed with either Locke's theory of
inherent limitations on the legislative power or Spencer's sociology
or both. In Powell v. Pennsylvania, 23 for example, the Court held
that a statutory scheme prohibiting persons from engaging in what
had previously been a lawful business did not infringe upon a
fundamental constitutional right protected by the fourteenth
amendment, and was not cognizable of remedy by the Court. This
conflicted with Locke's theory that natural law granted the right to
make use of one's property, thereby limiting the exercise of
government power. It also conflicted with Smith's and Spencer's
theories that permitting the individual freely to function in the
marketplace is in the best interests of society. The mating of these
socio-economic theories with the legal theories relating to the
meaning of due process brought about the birth of substantive
economic due process.
2.

Adoption

The case generally recognized as the first to apply substantive
economic due process was Allgeyer v. Louisiana. 24 The Louisiana
legislature had enacted a statute that made unlawful the issuance of
marine insurance by anyone who did not comply with various
119. See note 27 supra.

120. Id.
121. See generally S.
STUDY

FINE, LAISSEZ FAIRE AND THE GENERAL WELFARE STATE: A
THOUGHT
HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL

(1956); R.

OF CONFLICT IN AMERICAN

DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT

1860-1915 (1945).

122. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).

123. 127 U.S. 678 (1888). See note 112 supra.
124. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
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statutory prerequisites. To secure insurance from such an issuer was
also a violation of the law. The violation of the statute alleged in
Allgeyer was the sending of a letter through the mail notifying an
out-of-state insurer that an extant insurance policy would attach to
certain specified bales of cotton. 125 The Supreme Court of Louisiana
had affirmed the convictions, ruling that the act of writing the letter
of notification in the state was done to effect a policy of marine
126
insurance in violation of the statute.
The Supreme Court reversed the Louisiana court, holding that
the statute was a violation of the Constitution and "afforded no
justification for the judgment" against the defendant. 127 Focusing on
the fundamental right that the law violated, the Court stated,
The liberty mentioned in [the fourteenth] amendment means
not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere
physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the
term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free
in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in
all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his
livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or
avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts
which may be proper, necessary and essential to his
carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above
128
mentioned.
The Court then found that penalizing the defendant for conduct
occurring outside the state deprived him of due process of law.
The Court carefully pointed out that the liberty to contract was
not an absolute bar against the exercise of the state's police power
but must be balanced against the public good served by the
legislation. The Court went on to note that "[w]hen and how far such
power may be legitimately exercised with regard to these subjects
must be left for determination to each case as it arises. ' 12 9 But that
determination was now clearly within the province of the Court.
The liberty to contract born in Allgeyer' 30 that would justify the
invalidation of unreasonable legislation soon became the standard
right recognized by the Supreme Court in the substantive due
process area. The leading decision was Lochner v. New York.' 31 In
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 588. The original insurance contract was made outside the state.
Id. at 589.
Id. at 593.
Id. at 589.
Id. at 590. The Court went on to hold that it was within the state's police powers

to regulate the conduct of business within the state, but punishing its citizens for

an act arising outside the state must fall in light of the protected liberty interest.
130. The first decision in this country actually to turn on the liberty of contract was
Godcharles & Co. v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. St. 431 (1886). See Strong, supra note 8, at
425 n.31, citing R. Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 455 (1909).

131. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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Lochner, the statute in question forbade employers from requiring
bakery employees to work over sixty hours in one week, or ten hours
in one day. First, the Court recognized that the statute interfered
with the right of contract enjoyed by the employers and employees
and guaranteed by the liberty interest in the fourteenth amendment. 132 Next, the Court found that a statute prescribing maximum
hours of labor for bakers was not within the police powers of the
state because it did not promote the safety, health, morals and
general welfare of the citizens. 133 This view represented a societal
judgment based upon the theories of Smith and Spencer.
The Court then articulated the standard that would be employed
to invalidate legislation it thought would unreasonably abridge the
functioning of the free market:
It is a question of which of two powers or rights shall
prevail, - the power of the State to legislate or the right of
the individual to liberty of person and freedom of contract.
The mere assertion that the subject relates, though but in a
remote degree, to the public health, does not necessarily
render the enactment valid. The act must have a more direct
relation, as a means to an end, and the end itself must be
appropriate and legitimate, before an act can be held to be
valid which interferes with the general right of an individual to be free in his person
and in his power to contract in
34
relation to his own labor.
The Court went on to reiterate its opinion that there was no
foundation for the proposition that the statute was "necessary or
appropriate" as a health law, because the bakers' trade was not an
unhealthy one. 135 The relationship between the statute and the
preservation of health was not shown to be "clearly the case," and
therefore "the individuals, whose rights are thus made the subject of
legislative interference, are under the protection of the Federal
Constitution regarding their liberty of contract as well as person
....

"136

The Court stated that,

[i]t is impossible for us to shut our eyes to the fact that
many of the laws of this character, while passed under what
is claimed to be the police power for the purpose of
protecting the public health or welfare, are, in reality, passed
from other motives. We are justified in saying so when, from
the character of the law and the subject upon which it
legislates, it is apparent that the public health
or welfare
1 37
bears but the most remote relation to the law.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

53.
53-57.
57-58.
58-62.
61.
64.
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The opinion in Lochner recognized the bakers' liberty to contract,
but did not dwell on whether it was a fundamental right. The Court's
recognition of the right was secondary to its analysis of whether the
legislation was unreasonable. Because it was unreasonable, the
legislature had exceeded its powers, which meant that the liberty to
contract was deprived without due process of law.
D. Post-Lochner - The Reign Of Substantive Economic
Due Process
Lochner initiated the reign of the due process clause as a
limitation on what practices could be regulated by the states and
how. Although Lochner most definitely possessed social implications, it became the precedent by which economic regulations were
invalidated by the Court on the grounds that they were unreasonable and must fail in light of the liberty or property interests
involved. 138 In those cases, following the traditional analytical
framework discussed above, 139 the Court focused on the nature of the
legislative objectives and based its decisions upon whether it agreed
with those objectives. 140
138. See, e.g., Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S 587 (1936) (statute
forbidding employment of women at an oppressive and unreasonable wage
unconstitutional as violative of liberty to contract to obtain terms of employment; state has no power to set minimum wage where no emergency); New State

Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (statute which required an ice company
in obtaining a license to show necessity for ice business in location desired was
an unreasonable interference with business violative of the liberty to choose an
occupation); Williams v. Standard Oil Co. of La., 278 U.S. 235 (1929) (statute
fixing prices at which gasoline may be sold was an unconstitutional exercise of
the police powers where business is not affected with a public interest); Louis K.
Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928) (statute requiring that a pharmacy
be owned by a pharmacist unreasonably interfered with the property right of
owning a business); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928) (although a state may
regulate an employment agency, it may not fix the prices charged by it);
Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1 (1927) (statute requiring
manufacturers of milk or cream to purchase milk or cream at the same price from
all buyers invalidated because it had no reasonable relation to the anticipated
evil of monopoly); Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927) (the right of a
theater owner to set the admission price for tickets was a valuable property right,
which the state could not violate because the business was not affected with a
public interest); Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924) (statute
fixing the weight for loaves of bread was an unreasonable interference with
business); Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S.
522 (1923); (statute requiring employers to pay wages fixed by an industrial court
unreasonably deprived individuals of their liberty to contract); Adkins v.
Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (an Act of Congress fixing a minimum
wage that must be paid to women unreasonably infringed upon the right to
contract about one's own affairs); Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917) (statute
forbidding employment agencies destroyed an individual's right to engage in a
lawful business and was arbitrary and oppressive); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S.
1 (1915) (statute which prohibited employers from requiring or prohibiting their
employees from joining a union as a condition of employment impugned both the
employer's and employee's liberty and property interests and did not bear a
reasonable relation to the legislative purpose).
139. See text accompanying notes 23-31 supra.
140. See Gunther, Forward:In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 42-43 (1972).
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Although the thought of this era conjures up visions of the Court
arbitrarily striking down legislation left and right, more statutes
than not survived due process analysis.1 4 Of course, this was often
the result of the Court's agreement with the legislative purpose, but
there were also recognized exceptions to the rules enunciated in
Lochner. Thus, businesses involving employment particularly
injurious to health,'4 2 or affected with a public interest, 43 or in the
throes of an emergency situation 144 were all subject to varying
degrees of state or federal regulation. It can be observed that in the
Court's view these exceptions only exemplified what was reasonable.
The Court was not without its critics during this era,145
including those on the Court itself. The laws invalidated were often
the states' attempts to solve the problems brought on by the
Industrial Revolution or later, the Depression. Dissenters such as
Justices Holmes and Brandeis 146 often soundly criticized the
majority of the Court for acting as a reactionary force retarding the
states' attempts to ameliorate social problems. The dissenters also
criticized the majority of the Court for usurping the legislative
powers, 1 47 thus continuing the legal debate of whether due process
included the right to be free from unreasonable legislation.
IV. THE DEMISE OF SUBSTANTIVE ECONOMIC
DUE PROCESS
In 1929, the stock market crash triggered the Depression, which
had a strong impact on the philosophy underpinning the decisions
in Lochner and its progeny. As discussed previously, proponents of
laissez faire and Social Darwinism advocated the natural order in
the market place, with minimal governmental intrusion. 148 The
Depression arguably proved that the natural order led to economic
chaos, anarchy, and destruction. 49 The liberty to contract free from
governmental regulation threatened the survival of the marketplace.
In addition, the ravages of the Depression highlighted the need for
governmental protection against a downwardly spiraling economy.
141. See G.

GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS

1975).

565 (9th ed.

142. See, e.g., Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917) (mills); Holden v. Hardy, 169

U.S. 366 (1898) (coal mines).
143. See, e.g., Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917).
144. See, e.g., Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
145. See, e.g., Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39
HARV. L. REV. 431 (1926).
146. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
147. These dissents were later drawn upon by the Court as the basis for decisions that
rejected the substantive due process era. See, e.g., North Dakota State Board of
Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156, 166-67 (1973).
148. See text accompanying notes 119-23 supra.
149. See generally White, From Sociological Jurisprudenceto Realism, 58 VA. L. REV.
999 (1872).
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The Depression also paved the way for the ascendency of
Franklin Roosevelt to the Presidency of the United States. The
conservative Court during the Lochner era slowly began to change
and Roosevelt's more liberal appointees began to dominate the
Court. 150

Further, much of Roosevelt's far-reaching

New Deal

legislation had been struck down by the Court employing the type of
analysis exemplified by Lochner.'5' Roosevelt responded with the
famous Court-packing plan by which to change more rapidly the
political complexion of the Court. Arguably, this affected judicial
independence.
Along with the differences of opinion regarding the meaning of
due process that were always present on the Court during the
Lochner era, 5 2 these political and economic forces combined to
dissuade the Justices from imposing their predilections on legislative
policies. Legally, the Court began to question its constitutional right
to sit as a "superlegislature." Practically, the Court questioned its
own ability to answer the complex issue of what served the public
good.
A. Nebbia
Nebbia v.New York, 153 decided in 1934, marked the beginning of
the post-Lochner era. New York had established a Milk Control
Board with the power to fix retail prices that could be charged for
milk. The defendant in Nebbia had been convicted of selling milk
below the price set by the Board. On appeal, he attacked the
constitutionality of the statute and the Board's order that set the
price. The Court reviewed the legislative history of the statute, which
showed that its purpose was to alleviate instability in an essential
industry. In response to the defendant's claim that the statute and
order were excesses of the police power, the Court recognized that the
defendant's right to use of his property and his liberty of contract
were not absolute and must yield in the face of legislation designed
54
to serve the public good.
In reviewing the due process clause, the vehicle of constitutional
attack, the Court stated that it required that legislation "not be
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected
shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be
attained."' 5 5 The reasonableness of any regulation depended "upon
the relevant facts."' 156 The Court went on to note that although the
Constitution limited the powers of the state, it did not guarantee "the
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

McCloskey, supra note 11, at 42-43.
See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
See text accompanying notes 145-47 supra.
291 U.S. 502 (1934).
Id. at 523-25.
Id. at 525.
Id.
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unrestricted privilege to engage in a business or to conduct it as one
pleases."157
After balancing the rights guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment against the legislation affecting them, the Court in
Nebbia retreated from the Lochner era practice of judging whether
the objectives of the legislation were proper advancements of the
public good. The Court noted that the state was free to adopt
whatever economic policy it chose, so long as it "may reasonably be
deemed to promote public welfare. 1 58 "With the wisdom of the policy
adopted, with the adequacy or practicability of the law enacted to
forward it, the courts are both incompetent and unauthorized to
deal." 159
The language in Nebbia suggests, however, that due process still
protected against unreasonable legislation. Laws still could not be
arbitrary or capricious, and the Court expressly retained the endmeans test. But whatever the language in Nebbia, it began, with few
exceptions, 1 60 the deluge of cases that thoroughly rejected the Court's
practices during the Lochner era.
6
In 1937, the Court in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish1'
overruled one of the leading cases of the Lochner era 62 and upheld a
statute providing for minimum wages for women. Three years later,
Osborne v. Ozlin6 3 upheld a statute against due process attack that
prohibited insurance companies from doing business in the state
without a resident agent. Also upheld was a provision that set limits
on the compensation that must be paid to the agent. In Olsen v.
64
Nebraska,1
the Court upheld a price fixing statute in the
employment agency industry, stating, "[w]e are not concerned...
with the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the legislation.
Differences of opinion on that score suggest a choice that 'should be
left where ... it was left by the Constitution - to the states and to
Congress." ' 1 65 In Lincoln Federal Labor Union No. 19129 v.
Northwestern Iron & Metal Co.,' 6 6 the Court stated that under the
constitutional doctrine announced in Nebbia "the due process clause
157. Id. at 527-28.
158. Id. at 537.
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937);
Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936); Treigle v. Acme
Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189 (1936).
161. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). Some commentators select West Coast Hotel as the
beginning of the demise of substantive economic due process instead of Nebbia.
See, e.g., McCloskey, supra note 11, at 36-37.
162. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). Moorehead, decided the year
before West Coast Hotel but two years after Nebbia, had invalidated such
legislation.
163. 310 U.S. 53 (1940).
164. 313 U.S. 236 (1941).
165. Id. at 246, quoting Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 375 (1928) (Stone, J.,
dissenting).
166. 335 U.S. 525 (1949).
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is no longer to be so broadly construed that the Congress and state
legislatures are put in a strait jacket when they attempt to suppress
business and industrial
conditions which they regard as offensive to
16 7
the public welfare.' 1
In 1963 in Ferguson v. Skrupa,168 the Court upheld a statute that
prohibited any persons except lawyers from engaging in the
business of debt adjustment. The plaintiff in that case was not a
lawyer but had been engaged in the business for many years. The
lower court found that the statute was an unreasonable regulation of
a lawful business. The Supreme Court reversed, stating:
We conclude that the Kansas Legislature was free to decide
for itself that legislation was needed to deal with the
business of debt adjusting. Unquestionably, there are
arguments showing that the business of debt adjusting has
social utility, but such arguments are properly addressed to
the legislature, not to us. We refuse to sit as a "superlegislture to weigh the wisdom of legislation," and we emphatically refuse to go back to the time when courts used the Due
Process Clause "to strike down state laws, regulatory of
business and industrial conditions, because they may be
unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular
school of thought." Nor are we able or willing to draw lines
by calling a law "prohibitory" or "regulatory." Whether the
legislature takes for its textbook Adam Smith, Herbert
Spencer, Lord Keynes, or some other is no concern of ours.
The Kansas debt adjusting statute may be wise or unwise.
But relief, if any be needed, lies not with us but with the
body constituted to pass laws for the State of Kansas. 69
Thus, after the arguably excessive judicial intervention characterizing the Lochner era, the Court refused to continue to subject to
judicial review legislative determinations regarding the objectives of
a statutory scheme. State legislatures were free to identify any
aspect of the economy and attempt to regulate it. A state statute
intended to regulate economic affairs has not been invalidated by
the Supreme Court in over forty years. Unless an aggrieved party
could establish that a specific constitutional provision was violated,
such as the commerce clause, no relief could be had from legislation
that sought to adjust "the burdens and benefits of economic life
167. Id. at 536-37.
168. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
169. Id. at 731-32 (footnotes omitted). See also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Environmental Study Group, Inc., 98 S.Ct. 2620 (1978); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn
Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976); North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy v.
Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156 (1973); Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v.'Missouri, 342 U.S. 421
(1952); Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950);
Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949).
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....
"170
In short, the concept that there were any extraconstitutional limitations on the states' police powers pursuant to
the due process clause was almost a dead letter. Only the language
of the end-means test survived.
171
B. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland

Writing in 1962, one commentator, considering the options open
to the Court in the 1930's when seeking to abandon substantive
economic due process, stated that one "possibility was to retain the
rhetoric of the rational basis standard, but to apply it so tolerantly
that no law was ever likely to violate it. This was the course
ultimately chosen ....
As previously discussed, substantive due process review entailed
two steps: first, a determination if the legislation embodied a
permissible objective; and second, a determination if the means
chosen bore a reasonable relation to that objective. 17 3 Nebbia and its
progeny established that the Court would no longer judge the
purposes or objectives of a legislative scheme. Instead, it would defer
to the legislative judgment.
The second part of the test, however, was carefully retained by
the Court both in Nebbia and in subsequent cases. Thus, in
Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp.,174 the Court reviewed
a gas proration order issued by the Railroad Commission of Texas.
The avowed purpose of the regulatory scheme was to conserve a
natural resource of that state by preventing waste, while also
protecting the correlative rights of the parties being regulated. In an
opinion written by Justice Brandeis, 75 the Court stated that "the
170. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976). Many of the states
have retained substantive economic due process. See, e.g., State v. A. J. Bayless

Markets, Inc., 86 Ariz. 193, 342 P.2d 1088 (1959); United Interchange Inc. v.
Spellacy, 144 Conn. 647, 136 A.2d 801 (1957); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Village
of Lombard, 19 Ill. 2d 98, 166 N.E.2d 41 (1960); Pacesetter Homes, Inc. v. Village
of South Holland, 18 Ill. 2d 247, 163 N.E.2d 464 (1960); Gilbert v. Mathews, 186
Kan. 672, 352 P.2d 58 (1960); United States Brewers' Ass'n, Inc. v. State, 192 Neb.
328, 220 N.W.2d 544 (1974); Berger v. State Board of Hairdressing, 371 A.2d 1053
(R.I. 1977). See also Fasino v. Mayor, 122 N.J. Super. 304, 300 A.2d 195 (1973),
affl'd, 129 N.J. Super. 461, 324 A.2d 77 (1973); Commonwealth v. Stone, 191 Pa.
Super. Ct. 117, 155 A.2d 453 (1959).
171. 98 S. Ct. 2207 (1978).
172. McCloskey, supra note 11, at 39.
173. See text accompanying notes 23-31 supra.

174. 300 U.S. 55 (1937).
175. As noted previously, during the Lochner era, Justices Brandeis and Holmes often
dissented to the Court's review of the purposes of various state economic
regulatory schemes. See, e.g., Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 114

(1928) (Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., dissenting); Ribnick v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350,
359 (1928) (Stone, Holmes, and Brandeis, JJ., dissenting); Jay Burns Baking Co.

v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 517 (1924) (Holmes and Brandeis, JJ., dissenting). Their
dissents were the forerunners of the Court's adoption of the standard of due
process review in Nebbia. In later cases in which the Court abstained from
meaningfully reviewing statutory economic schemes, Justice Brandeis's dissents
were relied upon in applying the proper standards of review. See, e.g., North
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proration orders would not be valid if shown to bear no reasonable
relation either to the prevention of waste or the protection of
correlative rights, or if shown to be otherwise arbitrary."' 176 Since
there was no reasonable relation between the means chosen
(proration) and the purposes sought (prevention of waste and
protection of correlative rights), the Court held that those means
resulted in a deprivation of the plaintiffs' property in violation of the
fourteenth amendment.
Economic regulatory legislation was also held to be an invalid
exercise of the police power in Treigle v. Acme Homestead
Association.177 Louisiana had sought to preserve the assets of its
building and loan associations by enactment of a statutory scheme
that redefined the method for the withdrawal of shareholders'
interests. The Court recognized that a state had an interest in
preventing injury and loss to members of building and loan
associations. The sections of the statute in question, however, did
not "tend to conserve the assets of the association, to render it more
solvent, or to insure that its affairs [would] be administered so as to
protect the investments of the continuing and withdrawing
members."' 178 Consequently, the exercise of police power was not
deemed to have been exercised for an end that was in fact beneficial
to the public; nor were the means adopted reasonably suited to the
accomplishment of that end. The questioned sections were held to
impair the obligation of the plaintiffs contract and to deprive him
179
arbitrarily of vested property rights without due process of law.

176.
177.
178.
179.

Dakota State Board of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156
(1973).
300 U.S. at 69-70.
297 U.S. 189 (1936).
Id. at 196-97.
A review of later due process cases discloses that the Court purportedly
scrutinized economic regulatory legislation to determine if the ends of a statutory
scheme were accomplished by methods consistent with due process (i.e., whether
the means selected by a state had a reasonable or rational relation to the
objective sought to be attained). In Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348
U.S. 483 (1955), for example, one of the state regulations held constitutional was
a provision prohibiting optometrists from renting or occupying space in a retail
store. The Court identified the legislative purpose as an attempt to free the
profession from all taints of commercialism and held that the regulation had a
"rational relation to that objective and therefore ... [was not] beyond
constitutional bounds." 348 U.S. at 491 (emphasis added). See also Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 826, 833 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring "on the ground that this
state measure bears a reasonable relation to a constitutionally permissible
objective."); Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 224 (1949)
("[We cannot] say that the statute has no relation to the elimination of those
evils."); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) ("[R]egulation
which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the
community is due process.").
In other cases before the Court that generally are cited as proof of the demise
of economic substantive due process, the issue of whether the means rationally
approached the legislative objective was not argued or was too obvious to merit
discussion. See, e.g., North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug
Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156 (1973); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S.

30
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In Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,180 one of the
appellants sought review of its due process challenge based on the
dictates of Nebbia that the means must rationally relate to the
legislative end. 81 The Maryland legislature had enacted a statute
that, inter alia, prohibited producers and refiners of petroleum from
continuing directly or through a subsidiary to operate existing
company-operated retail service stations. 8 2 The Court of Appeals of
Maryland had enunciated the objective of the statutory scheme,
including paragraph (c), which relates to existing stations, as the
preservation of competition by assuring the
continued existence of
83
independent retail service station dealers.
The appeal to the Supreme Court on substantive due process
grounds was based on the appellant's argument that paragraph (c)
relating to existing company-operated stations bore no rational
relationship to the objective of preserving competition by assuring
the continued existence of independent retail service station
dealers. 84 This appellant expressly disavowed any intention of
requesting the Court to adjudicate the wisdom of paragraph (c) or
deciding whether it served the public interest.
The Court's response to this narrow due process argument was
that the statute "bears a reasonable relation to the State's legitimate
purpose in controlling the gasoline retail market.' 8 5 This holding
was the first instance in which the purpose of the Maryland statute
had been expressed so broadly. More significantly, the Court
departed from the rule expressed since Nebbia that due process
requires that the means employed by a state to control an industry's
activities by regulation or prohibition must reasonably relate to the
state's real purpose in controlling that industry. In Exxon, the Court
held that the regulation need merely relate to the control of the

180.
181.
182.
183.

421 (1952); Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335
U.S. 525 (1949); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941). In these cases the
wisdom of the legislative scheme was questioned rather than the relationship
between the ends and the means.
98 S. Ct. 2207 (1978).
The appellant making this argument was represented by Mr. Preston, one of the
authors of this article.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 157E(c) (1976).
See Governor of Maryland v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 410, 370 A.2d 1102 (1977).

184. Out of 3800 existing retail service stations, only 209 were operated by producers
and refiners of petroleum products. Appellants argued that it was irrational to
believe that 209 stations could conceivably monopolize a retail trade consisting
of 3800 gasoline stations, which, by necessity, will spread out over the state.
Thus, 3500 dealers could not be threatened by 209 company-operated stations,
and therefore the means embodied in paragraph (c) did not relate to the
objectives. The Maryland court had also focused on the continuing existence of
independent dealers that might be threatened if the companies diverted supplies
to company-operated stations. The appellants responded to this by pointing out a
specific provision of the Maryland statute (paragraph f)as well as other laws
forbidding misallocation of gasoline to company-operated stations. Thus,
paragraph (c) was not intended to achieve this goal, nor did it rationally do so.
185. 98 S.Ct. at 2213 (emphasis added).

1978]

Substantive Due Process

affected industry in order to comport with substantive due process.
Conceivably, any state regulation directed towards a segment of a
particular industry can be deemed to relate to the control of that
industry. Thus, any regulation could comport with the standard that
requires the means to relate to the end if the end is said to be the
control of the industry. Consequently, any regulation could comport
with substantive due process.18 6 The decision in Exxon, in conjunction with other post-Nebbia cases, bestows upon
statutes regulating
18 7
economic matters conclusive constitutionality.
C. Related Matters
The trend begun in Nebbia against employing substantive due
process to strike down state statutes quickly spilled over into other
areas of constitutional adjudication. As was discussed previously,
the Court, prior to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, had
used the obligation of contract clause and the doctrine of vested
rights to protect extra-constitutional property rights. 8 8 Although the
clause was infrequently used after the ratification of the fourteenth
amendment, the Court in the same year it decided Nebbia made clear
that it would not revive the obligation of contract clause to replace
the due process clause and substantive economic due process.18 9
Although the Court used the obligation of contract clause last Term
to invalidate an aspect of a state statute regulating economic
matters, 190 the tenor of the decision suggested that it would probably
not radically diminish the Court's reluctance to review closely laws
that seek to adjust economic matters.
Another interesting aspect of judicial review of economic
legislation is that of the role of the fifth amendment requirement of
just compensation for a taking of property. It may be remembered
that the Court's decision that this right was not included within due
process had been overruled during the period when use of the due
process clause was on the ascendancy. 91 Even Justice Holmes, the
"Great Dissenter" in the substantive economic due process cases
discussed above, had accepted the just compensation clause as being
186. Appellants petition for rehearing on this basis was denied.

187. The Court, however, continues to pay lip-service to the requirement that the
means rationally relate to the end. In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 2620 (1978), petitioners contended that a statute
that imposed a $560 million limitation on liability for nuclear accidents deprived
them of due process of law under the fifth amendment. The Court ruled that the
statute was "a legislative effort to structure and accommodate 'the burdens and
benefits of economic life,"' id. at 2636; and that the liability ceiling in the event
of nuclear accident rationally related to the Congressional purpose of encouraging the private development of electric energy by atomic power. Id. at 2636-40.
188. See text accompanying notes 48-59 supra.
189. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
190. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 98 S. Ct. 2716 (1978).
191. See note 105 supra.
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part of due process when state action deprived a person of his
property. 192 The Court now disfavors arguments based upon the just
compensation clause as a vehicle to protect property rights. 193 Few
94
cases, however, reach the Court on this issue.
Finally, the development of the use of the equal protection clause
paralleled the acceptance of due process as a means by which to
protect economic interests from being treated differently. The Court,
however, recently made it clear that equal protection could not
substitute for due process to protect economic or property rights
195
against state economic regulatory legislation.
V. PERSONAL RIGHTS: THE "NEW" SUBSTANTIVE
DUE PROCESS
During the Lochner era, the Court expanded the scope of due
process to protect more than the economic liberties of business
interests. In the case of Meyer v. Nebraska,196 the Court stated that
liberty included not only freedom from bodily restraint and the right
to contract, but also, the rights "to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a
home and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of ... [one's] own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men."' 97 The statute set aside in Meyer
forbade the teaching of languages other than English to students
who had not yet reached the eighth grade. The defendant had been
convicted for teaching German to a child in a Lutheran parochial
school. Th6 Court stated that if the statute was "arbitrary or without
reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the
State to effect," it violated the due process clause. 198
The Court struck down the statute on two grounds. It continued
to recognize the economic right to engage in an occupation, in this
case, teaching. The Court went further, however, and discussed the
historical importance of education in America. Although the Court
admitted that the state's purpose in attempting to foster a
homogeneous people was meritorious, forbidding the teaching of

192. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Because the just
compensation clause is in the Bill of Rights, arguably it was included in the
fourteenth amendment due process clause under theories of incorporation. But
see BERGER, supra note 1, at 134-56.
193. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, New York, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
194. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS, 602 (9th ed. 1975).
195. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
196. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
197. Id. at 399.
198. Id. at 399-400. The state court had found that the permissible objective of the
statute was to ensure that English was the mother tongue of children in the
state. Id. at 398.
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foreign language was too extreme to be a reasonable means to
achieve that end. 199
In Pierce v. Society of the Sisters,"° the Court invalidated a
statute that required parents in Oregon to send their children
between the ages of eight and sixteen to public school. The plaintiffs
in that case were a religious school and a private military academy.
The Court recognized the power of the state to regulate education,
but found that the statute "unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty
of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control." 20 1 The Court also recognized20 2 the
property interests of the schools in their continued existence.
Although both Meyer and Pierce included the Lochner-type
language of substantive economic due process review, there was a
subtle reliance on the nature of the right implicated by the state
action. In the midst of the post-Nebbia revolution, 203 the Court was
careful to note that review under substantive due process analysis
would still apply if the rights infringed upon by states' exercises of
the police powers were within the express provisions of the Bill of
Rights. 20 4 Since Nebbia, the Court has continued to define the liberty
and property interests protected by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment to include the guarantees in the Bill of
Rights. 20 5 Further, the Court upon rare occasion has expanded upon
the liberty interest to include rights of a personal nature. 20 6 In
addition, when dealing with procedural due process, the Court has
2°7
radically expanded the concept of property.
Beginning in 1965, the issue of substantive due process began to
receive attention once again in the context of personal rights. The
Court relied on the right to privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut,20 8
invalidating a statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives.
Attempting to avoid any charges that the Court was deciding a case
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 402.
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
Id. at 534-35.
Id. at 535-36.
See text accompanying notes 161-70 supra.
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
See, e.g., First National Bank v. Bellotti, 98 S. Ct. 1407 (1978) (Massachusetts
statute prohibiting business corporations to contribute funds to influence the
vote unreasonable in light of corporation's first amendment rights); Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (right to liberty in the fourteenth amendment
includes the freedoms of speech and press).
206. See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Schware v. Board of
Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Even Justices Brandeis and Holmes
advocated a broad approach to the liberty interest and due process when rights
of a personal nature were implicated by the state action. See, e.g., Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Holmes and Brandeis, JJ., concurring). But
see BERGER, supra note 1, at 270-71.
207. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
208. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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based upon the personal preferences of the Justices, the opinion by
Justice Douglas employed a substantive due process analysis while
going to great lengths to avoid the phrase and to place the right to
20 9
privacy within the Bill of Rights.
210
In Roe v. Wade, the Court again employed the right to privacy
to invalidate an anti-abortion law. The Court in Roe stated that only
those rights "'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered
'211
liberty' . . . are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.
The Court went on to find the right to privacy fundamental enough
to be included in the fourteenth amendment's liberty interest. Once
the right was recognized, the Court went on to judge the reasonableness of the legislation in light of the plaintiffs' liberty interest and
the state's objectives in prohibiting abortions. The Court again,
21 2
however, avoided expressly relying upon substantive due process.
2
13
Then in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio,
the Court
acknowledged its reliance on substantive due process as a means by
which to limit exercises of the state police powers. The law in
question in Moore was a housing ordinance limiting the occupancy
of a dwelling to a single family. "Family" was defined in such a
manner that Mrs. Moore violated the law by living in the dwelling
with her'son and two grandsons. She was convicted under the
statute and her case eventually reached the Court.
The Court ruled that Mrs. Moore possessed a right to live with
her family, and that it was fundamental enough to be protected by
the liberty interest in the fourteenth amendment. The Court then
identified the state objectives of the ordinance as preventing
overcrowding, minimizing traffic congestion and avoiding an undue
burden on the school system. The Court pronounced these "legitimate goals" but stated that "the ordinance ...
serves them
marginally, at best," and held that because of the "tenuous relation"
between the objectives and the means, the statute violated the due
process clause.21 4 The Court recognized the danger of using the due
process clause to control the substance of state legislation because
209. See Wellington, Common Law Rules and ConstitutionalDouble Standards:Some
Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 287 (1973) [hereinafter referred to as
Wellington]. The majority of Justices in Griswold explicitly stated that the right
to privacy upon which the case turned was included in the fourteenth
amendment concept of liberty. Id. Indeed, Justice Stewart stated in his
concurring opinion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 167-68 (1973), that Griswold
could not rationally be understood unless considered a substantive due process
case. Harlan's concurring opinion in Griswold made it clear that he considered it
a substantive due process case, and as such, strongly disagreed with the Court's
opinion. 381 U.S. at 499-500. For a discussion of Griswold, see Wellington at
285-97.
210. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
211. Id. at 152.
212. For a discussion of Roe as a case involving substantive due process considerations, see Wellington, supra note 209, at 300-11.
213. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
214. Id. at 500 (footnote omitted).
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its use could give rise to "judicial intervention" based on the
"predilections of those who at the time happen to be members of the
Court."2 15 Justice Powell implied that the Court had no alternative,
however, because the liberty at stake in Moore was "deeply rooted in
history and tradition" so as to deserve constitutional
this Nation's
216
protection.
Thus, substantive due process had meaning only where the
Court believed a personal right was so fundamental that it deserved
constitutional protection. All of the Justices concurring in the result
in Moore found that the ordinance did not reasonably serve the city's
purpose in enacting it. Yet, this by itself was of no import unless the
Court chose to annoint the deprived personal right as part of our
fundamental liberty. 217 Although the ordinance was unreasonable
regardless of the right involved, the Court apparently would have
upheld the legislation if it had decided that Mrs. Moore's right to live
with her grandsons was not part of her liberty interest.
The liberties implicated in Moore, Roe, and Griswold involved
personal rights that the Court found to be fundamental. The three
cases also involved marital or family interests. These extraconstitutional interests are the only ones implicated since 1965 that
as a
have triggered the Court's use of the due process clause
2 18
limitation upon the substantive reach of state legislation.
VI. CRITICISMS OF THE "NEW" SUBSTANTIVE
DUE PROCESS
A synthesis of Moore and Exxon indicates that the Court will
not guarantee due process protection against the reach of unreasonable legislation unless the Court accepts the right implicated as one of
fundamental liberty. This "new" substantive due process is laced
with contradictions. The Court is now determined that it not return
to the Lochner era and impose the predilections of the current
members of the Court when interpreting the due process clause.
During the Lochner era, the Court broadly interpreted the clause and
215. Id. at 502 (footnote omitted).

216. Id. at 503 (footnote omitted).
217. It could hardly be denied that liberty includes the right to live where one wants
with whom one wants. Alternatively, Justice Stevens argued that the right
involved in Moore was the right to use one's property as one wants. Id. at 513
(Stevens, J., concurring).
218. The Court has found that although liberty includes privacy, a person's right to
privacy does not protect information regarding the use of drugs, Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589 (1977); the right to engage in a homosexual relationship, Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), aff'g 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va.
1975); the right to protect one's reputation from defamation by public officials,
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); and the right of parents to prevent corporal
punishment being meted out to their children, Baker v. Owen, 423 U.S. 907
(1976), aff'g 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C. 1975). In addition, the liberty interest has
been held not to extend to a police officer's choice of hairstyle. Kelley v. Johnson,
425 U.S. 238 (1976).
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passed upon the validity of legislation based upon the Court's views
regarding what served the public good. Under the "new" substantive
due process, the Court restricts application of due process based
upon the Court's belief of what rights are historically fundamental
so as to deserve constitutional protections. In either case, the Court
is making a societal judgment rather than a judicial one.
Further, in choosing which rights are part of "the teachings of
history and . . .basic values that underlie our society,

'219

the Court

arbitrarily ignores the teachings of our history that do not permit
the distinction between the personal rights protected in Griswold,
Roe, and Moore and the economic rights denied in the substantive
economic due process cases. In Exxon, one of the rights implicated
by the Maryland statute was that which permitted producers or
refiners to continue operating their existing company-operated
stations. Such vested property rights were recognized by some
members of the Court as early as 1798 in Calder v. Bull,220 and most

certainly by the entire Court in 1810 in Fletcher v. Peck. 221 The
Court, however, judging by the perfunctory analysis given the
legislation in Exxon, refuses to recognize the right to continue using
one's property as a fundamental part of our heritage or values. Yet,
when construing the substantive reach of the due process clause, the
Court itself has recognized the interdependence of liberty and
property rights:
Such difficulties indicate that the dichotomy between
personal liberties and property rights is a false one. Property
does not have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy
property without unlawful deprivation, no less than the
right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth, a "personal"
right, whether the "property" in question be a welfare check,
a home, or a savings account. In fact, a fundamental
interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty
and the personal right in property. Neither could have
meaning without the other. That rights in property are basic
civil rights has long been recognized. J. Locke, Of Civil
Government 82-85 (1924); J. Adams, A Defence of the
Constitutions of Government of the United States of
America, in F. Coker, Democracy, Liberty, and Property
121-132 (1942); 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries, 138-40.222

The decision in Exxon also discloses the Court's inconsistent
view with regard to the liberty to engage in an otherwise lawful
occupation. Producers or refiners of petroleum products were in effect
told that their right to continue engaging in the retail sale of
219.
220.
221.
222.

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965).
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). See text accompanying notes 40-47 supra.
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). See text accompanying notes 48-52 supra.
Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
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gasoline was not within the liberty interest of the due process clause.
Yet, in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,223 the Court apparently
decided that the plaintiffs right to engage in the practice of law was
part of the liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment. The Court
ruled that the state deprived him of the liberty to engage in an
occupation without due process of law when it arbitrarily denied him
the right to take the bar exam based on behavior engaged in and
beliefs held by the plaintiff more than fifteen years before the
denial. 224 In Exxon, the Court did not require the state to show any
rational connection between the prohibition against producers and
refiners continuing to engage in an otherwise lawful occupation and
the purposes of forbidding such continued operation. In Schware,
however, the Court found that the reasons for prohibiting the
plaintiff from taking the bar examination had no "rational
connection with [the plaintiffs] fitness or capacity" to practice
law.

225

The distinction between Schware and Exxon turns on the nature
of the right affected by the particular state action. In Schware, the
rights impugned were of a personal nature, whereas Exxon
purportedly regulated only the "burdens and benefits of economic
life.

' 226

As a practical matter, statutes regulating business are in

effect conclusively presumed constitutional. The teachings of history
do not permit the distinction between those rights of a personal
nature and those rights that implicate economic interests. Contributing to the climate for secession from England were British laws that
restricted the colonists' business ventures, such as those prohibiting
American manufacturers from manufacturing iron wares for export,
or those requiring all goods or commodities that were shipped in or
out of the colonies to be carried on British ships with British masters
and predominantly British crews. 227 Indeed, one persuasive theory of
history suggests that the Constitution was prompted by the
economic interests of those who met in Philadelphia to bring forth a
new nation. 228 Thus, the teachings of history suggest that economic
interests and the rights of business were very much part of the
fundamental values at the inception of this country.
But the most draconian aspect of the Court's present approach
to substantive due process is the refusal to give effect to the
223. 353 U.S. 232 (1956).

224. During the 1930's and early 1940's, the plaintiff had used various aliases to
obtain employment, had once been arrested but not convicted, and had been a

member of the Communist Party. These were the reasons given by the Bar
Examiners for not permitting the plaintiff to take the Bar Examination in the
mid-1950's. 353 U.S. at 234-35.
225. Id. at 239.
226. Usery v..Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976).
227. R. HOFSTADTER, W. MILLER & D. AARON, THE UNITED STATES 66-71; 126-37 (2d
ed. 1967).
228. C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES (Free Press 6th ed. 1969).
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historical and fundamental American concept that the powers of the
legislatures are inherently limited by citizens' liberty and property
rights. As noted previously, the concept that the legislatures' powers
were limited emerged out of Locke's theory of the social compact. 229
By 1776 and the Revolution, Locke's ideas "had become virtually
axiomatic in America. '230 Yet, in the area of substantive economic
due process, the Court refuses to take more than at most a cursory
look at the reasonableness of legislation that often either forbids the
use of property and enjoyment of liberty or severely regulates
them. 231 If the rights violated are of a personal nature, the Court
decides whether they are important enough to deserve constitutional
protection before consenting to view the reasonableness of legislation. In sharp contrast, rights not considered fundamental, but
rights nonetheless, can be subjected to the most unreasonable
regulation without implicating the Constitution.
The Court shirks its constitutional duty of guarding significant
rights when it advises litigants that it is indifferent to unreasonable
legislation and that any complaints should be addressed to the
legislature. One clear purpose of the Constitution, whether contained
in the Bill of Rights or in the fourteenth amendment, is to protect the
rights of the minority from the tyranny of the majority. Although
the majority must be able through their elected representatives to set
policy, the rights of the minority should not be ignored by the
judiciary.
VII. THE REASONABLENESS OF LEGISLATION
Rather than arbitrarily applying substantive due process review
only where the Court deems a right fundamental, the Court should
recognize that the due process clause limits the exercise of
governmental power whenever legislation unreasonably results in
the deprivation of any liberty or property right. This does not mean
a return to the Lochner era when the Court believed its determinations regarding what served the public good superseded those of the
legislature. The problem with the Lochner era was not that the Court
judged the reasonableness of legislation in achieving a goal, but that
the Court replaced the legislative judgment with its own opinion
regarding what goals to achieve.
State or federal legislation should have the presumption of
constitutionality befitting an expression of the will of the majority.
It should not, however, be conclusively presumed constitutional
solely because the Court does not happen at that time to favor the
229. See text accompanying note 15-19 supra.
230. R. HOFSTADTER, W. MILLER & D. AARON, THE UNITED STATES 140 (2d. ed. 1967).
231. In Exxon, some of the producers or refiners who brought suit had testified that
they could not operate the stations through dealer operations, but would be
forced to withdraw from the Maryland market. Brief for Appellant Continental
Oil Co. at 10, 34-35, Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 98 S. Ct. 2207 (1978).
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liberties infringed upon by the legislation. The Court should
continue to defer to legislative judgment, but when that judgment is
shown to be unreasonable, as when it is the result of pure legislative
whim without foundation, or where the means embodied in the
statute do not rationally approach the problem it purports to correct,
the Court should play some role in protecting against the tyranny of
the majority will. It was this type of analysis that was used by
232

Justice Brandeis in Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp.

to invalidate state legislation that had no rational connection with
what the state intended to accomplish. 233 Justice Brandeis did not
advocate that the Court usurp the legislative function; indeed, he
had fulminated against the majority of the Court's practice of
usurping the legislative power. 234 But as exemplified by his opinion
in Thompson, he believed that there were some restraints pursuant
to the due process clause on the substance of state legislative
regulations.
Weighing the reasonableness of legislation does not require that
the Court return to the excesses of the Lochner era to impose its
conceptions of what served the public good. For example, a statute
such as the Virginia criminal statute in Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney235 prohibiting so-called "crimes against nature," which
included sexual activities engaged in by homosexuals, should not be
invalidated because a court believes that homosexuality does not
present a danger to public morality or indecency. But insofar as the
enforcement of such a statute permits the state to invade the privacy
of the home and impose criminal sanctions upon consenting adults
engaged in such practices, the reasonableness vel non of the statute
should be examined by the courts. The majority's decision that
homosexuality is an evil should be honored, but if there is no
rational relationship between the majority's reasons for declaring
homosexuality an evil and the effect of their declaration, the rights
of the minority in personal decisions of intimate concern should be
236
protected.
Similarly, in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,237 the
legislative judgment that the Maryland retail gasoline market would
be benefitted by the exclusion of stations operated by producers or
refiners of petroleum products should not be overturned because the
courts believe that it would not benefit competition to restrict
producers or refiners from expanding their operations. If the courts
decide, however, that there is no rational basis for excluding existing
competitors from an existing, highly competitive market in the name
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

300 U.S. 55 (1937).
See text accompanying notes 174-76 supra.
See text accompanying notes 146-47 supra and note 175 supra.
403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
Id. at 1203 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
98 S. Ct. 2207 (1978).
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of preserving competition, the right to continue engaging in a lawful
business should be protected.
Justice Holmes in Nash v. United States238 ruled that reading
the standard of reasonableness into the Sherman Act 239 did not
result in that provision's being void for vagueness because
reasonableness was capable of definition. This recognition of the
standard of reasonableness is not any less valid for the Court when
ascertaining the reasonableness of legislation. Legislation that is
unreasonable because it has no foundation, but is the product of pure
legislative whim, or legislation that does not rationally approach the
objective it intends to address, should be deemed a deprivation of the
process that is due the citizenry when the legislative branch enacts
legislation affecting their liberty or property. 240 To believe otherwise
is to grant the legislatures in this country carte blanche authority to
regulate or prohibit any matters they choose, so long as they do not
violate a specific constitutional provision, or the Court's narrow view
of fundamental liberty, and no matter how oppressively those
regulations or prohibitions are visited upon segments of society. The
Court's continuing practice of shirking its duty to afford protection
against the reach of legislation serves "to render the Constitution
impotent" 241 as a charter protecting the individual against arbitrary
government action.
Of course, legally, the methodology advocated herein requires
that the judiciary use the due process clause as a control on the
content of legislation. The authors are aware of Professor Berger's
recent book in which he convincingly states the case that the due
process clause was never intended to have such a use. 242 Whatever
the merit of his arguments, judicial reliance upon the due process
clause is an established fact of constitutional adjudication. A return
3
to Justice Miller's opinion in Slaughter-House24
is neither practical
nor likely to occur.
238. 229 U.S. 373 (1913).

239. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
240. Of course, legislation that is reasonable in that it is not the product of arbitrary
or capricious whim, or which reasonably approaches -the objectives of the
legislature in enacting it still will adversely affect the rights of-ihe citizenry. If
such is the case, the Court should uphold the legislative judgment unless the
right is so fundamental and important that the Court decides it cannot be
abridged under almost any circumstance. This type of deference is generally
accorded by the Court, for example, to the right to travel. See, e.g., Memorial
Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974). But see Califano v. Gautier
Torres, 98 S. Ct. 906 (1978). Additionally, one commentator has advocated that
the Court rule economic regulations violative of the due process clause "if the
government can achieve the purposes of the challenged regulation equally
effectively by one or more narrower regulations." Struve, The Less-RestrictiveAlternative Principle and Economic Due Process, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1463 (1967).
241. Comment, Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri; A New Light on the Constitution, 47 NEV. L. REV. 252, 254-55 (1952).
242. BERGER, supra note 1.
243. See text accompanying notes 79-82 supra.
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Further, one of the keys to the continuing vitality of the
Constitution is its flexibility over the years since its drafting and
ratification. The Constitution is not stagnant but evolves as the
necessity of the times requires. When the fourteenth amendment was
adopted, government regulation was not as prevalent as it is today.
The growth of government necessarily diminished the freedom of
those governed. It is not unreasonable for the Constitution to evolve
to meet that change.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As noted in the opening paragraph of this article, the Court's
changing applications of substantive due process have expanded or
limited the Constitution's protections against governmental action.
In each fluctuation, however, the Court has gone to excesses in
either unreasonably scrutinizing legislation or unreasonably abridging basic rights. The best method to avoid excesses at either end of
the spectrum is to establish a mode of review that permits the Court
to determine the constitutionality of legislation based on judicial
standards of reasonableness rather than on the individual Justices'
personal views of what rights are fundamental enough to be
protected, or what exercises of the police powers serve the public
welfare.

